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Abstract 
The goal of this dissertation is to obtain insight about the behavior of Ecosystem in 
Banking sector during economic incidents or political shocks that provoke changes in 
Bank Holding Companies characterized as “Top” (N =100) based on their Market 
Capitalization during period 2018-2019. Regarding the last results and the availability of 
data at FDCI Database, we find the profitability ratios of top banks (46 out of 100): (a) 
Return on Assets (ROA), (b) Return on Equity (ROE) and (c) Net Interest Margin (NIMY) 
during 2005-2018 (quarterly data). Using the network analysis, we take metrics: (a) 
Weighted Degree for each node (bank), (b) Density for the whole network and (c) the 
Minimum Spanning Tree (MST) method. The inputs for the above metrics are the ROA, 
ROE and NIMY and the outputs inform us which of the top banks are Core, Influential 
with Positive Weights (positive correlation) and Influential with Negative weights 
(negative correlation). It is important to refer the role of Systemic Risk that emerges 
from the type of interconnection between banks and its two related concepts the “Too 
Connected to Fail”  (TCTF) and “Two Big to (let) Fail” (TBTF).  Taking into account the 
results we refer how the top 10 (out of 46) banks are characterized during 2005-2018 
(core or influential or both) and the amount of core and influential banks each time 
period. One important remark based on our analysis is that the Banks in US tend to be 
robust to financial shocks and struggle to revive from the crises.  Regarding to density, 
our network analysis metrics have the same process as it is depicted in GDP graph. 
Finally, we assume that network analysis is an innovative field that provides us hidden 
and influential role of the nodes (banks). 
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1. Introduction to Banking Networks 
The banking ecosystem can be modeled as complex network of interdependencies, which evolve 
dynamically in time. Banking network method lays stress on analyzing the relevance among banks 
and its process during time. Thus, the contribution of banking network gives us the opportunity 
to recognize the correlation among banks which can be clearly measured and how banks 
“behave” when an economic shock emerges.  
 
We present the relevant literature in three key directions: (a) stock market networks, (b)networks 
relevant to macro-economic analysis, and (c) networks of interesting parties, where the 
properties of the financial sector (usually banking institutions) are examined. More specifically: 
 In the first group of studies, researchers focus on exploring networks of stocks to examine 
if their topology is driven from some intelligible and economically interpretable way, in 
order to gain more details related to the organization of equity markets.  
 In the second group of studies, researchers mainly focus on the relations between 
countries’ economic performance and examines their relations based on their trade or 
financial bonds. 
 In the third group of studies, researchers aim to focus their interest on the structure of 
the financial network, where they explore the contagion processes between banking 
institutions and attempt to find ways of supervising it. 
 
Stock market networks 
A set of representative stock market applications include the following in which  Vandewalle et 
al. (2001) [1] focus on the examination of the U.S. stock market and find -inter alia- that the U.S. 
stock network topology follows a power law despite the addition of new stocks during time. 
Bonanno et al. (2004) [2] attempt to create artificial financial networks and compare them to real 
equity networks to test whether correlations between stocks can be explained in an economically 
meaningful way as well. Tse et al. (2010) [3] had the opportunity to use U.S. stock data and after 
constructing the network of stocks they report that the structure of the network possesses scale-
free properties and they create a new index of stocks that can be used as an alternative to existing 
stock indices in the U.S. market. In their paper Tumminello et al. (2010) [4] use data for 10 U.S. 
stocks and apply a set of different clustering techniques aiming to compare their ability of 
uncovering clusters of stocks with same behavior without the need of supervision by the 
researcher accordingly. Bowden (2012) [5] comes up with a virtual stock market network and 
focus on examining the contagion process across sectors and stocks depending on the properties 
of each node and the aggregate topology of the network by altering parameters such as node 
degree, scale-freeness of the network, etc. 
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Macro-economic networks 
One of the first macroeconomic studies that used network analysis is the one of Hill (1999) [6]. In 
this work the author builds networks of products across countries and examines their properties 
aiming to uncover price dissimilarities and to test the Purchasing Power Parity theory. Garlaschelli 
et al. (2007) [7] construct from scratch complex networks of countries based on their GDP 
correlations and on their trade links. Then they compare the two network instances to examine 
the relation between trade openness and GDP evolution during time. In a similar analysis Schiavo 
et al. (2010) [8] creates networks for the trade linkages as well as the financial bonds between 
countries to examine their important role in the respective countries’ economic ties. They find 
that for the same group of countries, trade links are generally more developed the financial ones. 
Caraiani (2013) [9] constructs networks of countries based on their GDP correlations to examine 
the similarity of the respective business cycles. 
 
 
Banking supervision networks 
The third part of literature depicts and analyses the financial (more specifically the banking) sector 
as a complex network. In their paper, Allen and Gale (2000) [10] examine the structure of banking 
networks aiming to examine their resilience in financial contagion depending on their topological 
features. Cajueiro and Tabak (2008) [11] construct the complex network of Brazilian banks. They 
find that the network presents scale-free properties with only a handful of institutions presenting 
a very high node degree, depending on the type of the institution’s financial activity. Gai et al. 
(2011) [12] attempt to model the interbank lending activity as a complex network and examine 
the contagion paths of the 2008-2009 financial crisis. They actually find that the concentrated 
topology of the network may have amplified the contagion process between financial institutions. 
Minoiu and Reyes (2013) [13] aim to perform an inter-temporal analysis of the financial linkages 
between countries and find that the country connectivity has a trend to rise before the respective 
rise in connectivity in financial and debt networks. Last but not least, Papadimitriou et al. (2013) 
[14] utilize complex networks in an attempt to find a set of representative financial institutions 
that can be used by the supervising authority as gauges through which the entire banking network 
can be efficiently and effectively monitored. 
 
1As the financial field has a crucial role in the whole economy around the world, it is justifiably 
important the existence of monitoring in banking system in order to achieve a stable economy 
without incidents such as bank distress. The consequences of financial crises have a significant 
cost to the sector of economy. To be more clear, during the period of 1998 the International 
Monetary Fund [15] found that the total output loss related to the banking crisis has a part of 
GDP near 10.2% in the countries of OECD. Moreover Hoggarth et al. [16] found that the total 
cost to the whole economy based on a research of 33 banking crises with time horizon 25 years, 
were   near  20% as a part  of  GDP.  An  updated  paper of IMF  [17] have found  that  in 10 
countries the total cost during period of 2007 and 2009 which we had the mortgage crises, has 
as result an output loss near 25% . The consequences of the economic crises have been resulted 
                                                 
1 Papadimitriou, Theophilos, Periklis Gogas, and Benjamin M. Tabak. "Complex networks and 
banking systems supervision", Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2013. 
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in the household consumption as well. [18]. Ackermann [19] mentioned that the above type of 
costs could be lower when the monitoring and supervision in financial and banking sector tend 
to be more strict and effective.   
 
2A list of papers had examined the reasons and results of the failure in banking sector e.g.  
Demirgüç Kunt and  Detragiache [20,21] in which they found that the bank stability is influenced 
by  the existence of deposit insurance in 61 countries near 20 years.  The mortgage crisis during 
period 2007 and 2009 lead to the crucial issue of existence of effective bank supervision in order 
to avoid the economic shocks. Moreover when the problems are not identified immediately the 
possible suggestions would be more costly [22]. Evaluating and monitoring the potential future 
contagion risks from banking shocks must be done effectively at every country during time.  An 
efficient, comprehensive and close supervising authority will try to minimize the   crucial effects 
of asymmetric information and uncertainty as well.   
 
Barth [23] focus on researching the regulations of banks near 160 countries and evaluating how 
valuable is the policy of Basel to regulation. An important number of researchers  use different 
and more strict datasets and show interesting outputs addressing to a wide range of countries 
[24–33]  but another amount of researchers  aim to create models ( theoretical approach) 
connections in lots of interbank [34–36].  Last but not least Gai et al. [37] refer that in the banking 
network its type of characteristics and shape played an influential role  in  defining    the potential 
financial contagion. Last the most recent paper from YanhuiGu et al. 2019 [38] suggest a new 
approach to the assessment of banking systemic risk contagion based on network dynamic time-
variant contagion kinetics model. The conclusion presents that high banking risk contagion rate, 
low risk immunization rate or low risk isolation protection rate are the basic reasons for that the 
“risk contagion reproductive rate” reaches the threshold value to make banking systemic risk 
contagion uncontrollable, and it is crucial to ensure banking system safety. 
 
 
 
Systemic Risk 
The systemic risk is the possibility that an event at the company level has the ability to trigger 
severe instability or collapse an entire industry or the whole economy. Systemic risk was a “core” 
contributor to the financial crisis during 2008. Companies that were considered to be a systemic 
risk are called "Too big to fail." 
 
The above firms are relative to their respective industries or were a crucial part of the overall 
economy. A company that is interconnected (highly) –as we will see in the “Results Chapter” with 
others could be also a source of systemic risk. An important remark is that systemic risk should not 
be confused with systematic risk. More specifically systematic risk is addressed to the entire 
financial system. 
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Although an important number of companies are considered "too big to fail" they finally will if 
the government does not interfere during turbulent economic times. 
 
 
Some examples of systemic risk 
1. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, globally known as Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act had introduced and prepare extensively an enormous set of new 
laws that are supposed to prevent another Great Recession from occurring by tightly 
regulating key financial institutions to limit systemic risk. An intensively debate has been 
regarding to the changes need to be made to the reforms to facilitate the growth of small 
business as well. 
 
2. Lehman Brothers’ size and their integration into the U.S. economy triggered it a source of 
systemic risk. In the case of the firm collapsed, this created problems throughout the 
financial system and the economy. More specifically capital markets froze up while 
businesses and consumers could not get loans anymore, or could only get loans if they 
were extremely creditworthy and posing minimal risk to the lender. 
 
3. At the same time AIG was also suffering from serious financial problems. The same as 
Lehman, AIG’s interconnectedness with other financial institutions made it a source of 
systemic risk during the financial crisis period. Though AIG's portfolio of assets tied to 
subprime mortgages and its participation in the residential mortgage-backed securities 
(RMBS) market through its securities-lending program led to collateral calls accordingly, a 
loss of liquidity and a crucial downgrade of AIG's credit rating while the value of the 
securities dropped. Regarding to the U.S. government that did not bail out Lehman it 
decided to bail out AIG with loans of more than $180 billion, preventing and “protecting” 
the company from going bankrupt. An important number of analysts and regulators 
believed that an AIG bankruptcy would be a crucial cause of numerous other financial 
institutions to collapse as well. 
 
As it is clearly aforementioned, the information about the banks are interconnected plays a crucial 
role in the case of systemic risk. 
Two important concepts that are related to systemic risk is the “Too Connected to Fail”  
(TCTF) and “Two Big to (let) Fail” (TBTF) 
 
Too Connected to Fail 
"Too connected to fail" or TCTF concept means that a financial institution which is so connected 
to other institutions where its failure would have the probability to lead to a huge turnover in the 
whole economic system. Taking into consideration the financial crisis during 2007-2008 where it 
is highlighted that a small turmoil can lead to a big fallback in the financial system because 
financial institutions had formed a highly interconnected network.  
Regarding to a network science point of view this means that some nodes (firms) have very high 
degree or they are linked too many other nodes which this may lead to important remarks related 
to the crisis or future incidents or crises. 
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Moreover, as a result based on the previous, they play an influential role in the system, which 
could be highly important in the case of sudden disturbances.  The recognition of this effect is the 
source of the revival of Macro Prudential regulation. Though in this case one doesn't have clearly 
metrics such as assets’ value or the volume of financial services as well, there are some 
approaches focusing to establish a clear method in order to identify the key institutions in the 
network (the Eigenvector centrality, node degree, Debt Rank). 
 
 
Too big to Fail 
"Too big to (let) fail" case refers that certain corporations, mainly financial institutions, are so 
large and so interconnected that in the case of their failure would be disastrous to the greater 
economic system and that they therefore must be supported by government when they face 
potential failure. The above colloquial term "too big to fail" was popularized by U.S. Congressman 
Stewart McKinney in a 1984 Congressional hearing, discussing the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation's intervention with Continental Illinois as well. This term had previously been used 
occasionally in the press. 
 
The proponents of the above theory believe that some institutions are so crucial that they should 
become recipients of beneficial financial and economic policies from governments or central 
banks accordingly. Some of the economists such as Paul Krugman claimed that economies of scale 
in banks and in other businesses are worth preserving, so long as they are well regulated in 
proportion to their economic clout, and therefore that "too big to fail" status can be acceptable 
as well. More specifically the global economic system must also deal with sovereign states being 
too big to fail. 
 
From the other side opponents had asserted that one of the problems that arises is moral hazard 
whereby a company that has benefit from these protective policies will seek to profit by it,  taking  
positions and decisions  that are high-risk high-return, as they are able to leverage these risks 
related to the policy preference they receive as well. 
 
During 2014, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and others referred that the problem still 
had not been dealt with. Based on the individual components of the new regulation system for 
systemically important banks (additional capital requirements, enhanced supervision and 
resolution regimes as well) likely reduced the prevalence of TBTF, the fact that there is a definite 
list of systemically important banks considered TBTF has a partly offsetting impact on the banks. 
 
 
2. Complex Networks Theory 
Regards to network analysis literature review, the first study that had explored the merits of 
network analysis was the one that conducted by Euler (1751) [44]. More specifically this was a 
path-rooting problem where Leonhard Euler had tried to find a unique path to connect the 
individual parts of the town of Konigsberg through seven bridges as it is mentioned in its research. 
But the author eventually failed because the problem turned out to be mathematically unsolvable 
but his effort offered the opportunity to be opened a path for the further use and development 
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of network analysis. Another work that took advantage from the use of network analysis was the 
well-known experiment of psychologist Milgram (1967) [45] in which he examined the average 
length of the path between random individuals in the U.S. area. Furthermore Granovetter (1974) 
[46] published a relevant social network study where he examined the important effect of the 
number of acquaintances in the possibility of finding a job in different field. Based on social 
networks, two more recent studies should not be omitted. The first is by Newman (2001) [47] and 
the second by Barabasi et al. (2002) [48] both of which work on scientific collaboration networks 
accordingly. An interesting fertile field of applications is the one of metabolic and biological 
networks in which the relevant works include Thieffry et al. (1998) [49], Schwikowski et al. (2000) 
[50], Wagner et al. (2001) [51] and Shen-Orr et al. (2002) [52]. Other famous and useful 
applications include air transportation networks (Guimera et al., 2005) [53], the power grids 
(Pagani and Aiello, 2013) [54], the World Wide Web (Albert et al., 1999) [55], Computer Networks 
(Faloutsos et al., 1999) [56], The World Trade Network (Reyes et al., 2008) [57], food webs 
(Montoya and Sole, 2002) [58], Data Mining including Big Data (Boginski et al., 2006 [59]; Shen 
and Li, 2010) [60] etc. 
 
Correlation Networks (weighted, undirected) from standard Person correlation index  
Networks provide the best known way to represent complex banking systems, being the 
mathematical language for describing interdependencies. Networks consist of nodes connected 
via links. The nodes-banks 𝜅 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁 are characterized by time series 𝜓𝜅(𝑡), where 𝑡 =
0, 1, ….is the discrete time variable. The link 𝜅 → 𝜆 from bank κ to bank λ is characterized by the 
corresponding directed weight 𝑤𝜅→𝜆, which may be estimated using some appropriate 
correlation or causality index. In this work, the networks are constructed using the standard 
Pearson Correlation Index, Therefore, we have: 
 
𝑤𝜅→𝜆 = 𝑤𝜆→𝜅 = 𝑤𝜅𝜆 =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜓𝜅(𝑡),𝜓𝜆(𝑡))
√𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜓𝜅(𝑡))∙√𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜓𝜆(𝑡))
 , 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ − 1 ≤ 𝑤𝜅𝜆 ≤ 1             [1.1] 
 
where:  
 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜓𝜅(𝑡), 𝜓𝜆(𝑡)) is the covariance of the 2 time series 𝜓𝜅(𝑡) and 𝜓𝜆(𝑡)for fixed number 
of observations (e.g. from 𝑡 = 2005 to 𝑡 = 2018) 
 √𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜓𝜅(𝑡)) is the square root of variance (standard deviation) of 𝜓𝜅(𝑡) for the same 
fixed number of observations 
 √𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜓𝜆(𝑡)) is the square root of variance (standard deviation) of 𝜓𝜆(𝑡) for the same 
fixed number of observations 
 
We note the following: 
   
 
[8] 
 
 the standard Pearson Correlation estimates the statistical linear correlation between the 
2 time series 𝜓𝜅(𝑡) and 𝜓𝜆(𝑡). We highlight that statistical correlation (linear or nonlinear) 
does not imply causation (causal relationship). Causality networks may be constructed 
using appropriate methods, like Granger causality.   
 the standard Pearson Correlation cannot catch the direction of influence between the 2 
time series 𝜓𝜅(𝑡) and 𝜓𝜆(𝑡). This means that 𝑤𝜅→𝜆 = 𝑤𝜆→𝜅, and therefore we denote it 
simply as 𝑤𝜅𝜆. Of course, as there is no direction of influence, the constructed networks 
are weighted, undirected with positive and negative weights(−1 ≤ 𝑤𝜅𝜆 ≤ 1). 
 the networks are complete graphs (every node is connected to all other N-1 nodes), which 
means that all off-diagonal weights are non-zero (the probability to have exactly zero 
correlation between two different nodes-banks is almost zero). 
 at the square NxN weight matrix, constructed from standard Pearson Correlation, all 
diagonal elements are equal to one, that is 𝑤𝜅𝜅 = 1 for all 𝜅 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁 
 
We will assess the emerging dynamics of banking networks in terms of:  
 weighted degree (positive and negative) 
 weighted density (positive and negative) 
 MST for identifying core banks 
 
Weighted Degree of a node-bank (local-individual index) [61] 
The positive weighted degree 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝜅
+ of bank𝜅 is the sum of itsoff-diagonal positive weights:  
𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝜅
+ = ∑ 𝑤𝜅𝜆
𝑁
𝜆=1
𝜆≠𝜅
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑤𝜅𝜆 > 0        [1.2] 
By analogy, the negative weighted degree 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝜅
− of bank𝜅 is the sum of its off-diagonal 
negative weights:  
𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝜅
− = ∑ 𝑤𝜅𝜆
𝑁
𝜆=1
𝜆≠𝜅
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑤𝜅𝜆 < 0     [1.3] 
The above two indices give us information about the direct influence of bank 𝜅 to the whole 
banking network. Banks with high weighted degree are called “hubs” or “influencers”. 
 
Weighted Density of the whole network (global-systemic index) [61] 
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The weighted density of a network is calculated by dividing the sum of existing off-diagonal 
weights to the maximal possible sum of off-diagonal weights. The denominator corresponds to a 
complete graph with all off-diagonal weights are maximal. 
Therefore, the positive weighted density is calculated from positive off-diagonal weights 𝑤𝜅𝜆 as:  
𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦+ =
∑ (∑ 𝑤𝜅𝜆
𝛮
𝜆=1
𝜆≠𝜅
)𝛮𝜅=1
𝑁∙(𝑁−1)
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑤𝜅𝜆 > 0      [1.4] 
 
By analogy, the negative weighted density is calculated from negative off-diagonal weights 𝑤𝜅𝜆 
as:  
𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦− =
∑ (∑ |𝑤𝜅𝜆|
𝛮
𝜆=1
𝜆≠𝜅
)𝛮𝜅=1
𝑁∙(𝑁−1)
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑤𝜅𝜆 < 0        [1.5] 
For the negative weighted density, we use the absolute value |𝑤𝜅𝜆| because density is a 
percentage from 0% to 100%. 
 
The above two indices give us information about the percentages of positive and negative weights 
within the network, which means how much the nodes-banks are positive or negative correlated 
as a whole. Values close to zero indicate a sparse network and/or low weights (weak correlations), 
while values close to one indicate a dense network and/or high weights (strong correlations, 
positive or negative). 
 
 
 
Minimum Spanning Tree (MST) 
In order to compute the MST we first find the distances 𝑑𝜅𝜆 between each pair of banks 𝜅and 
𝜆from the following formula used inPapadimitriou et al. (2013): 
𝒅𝜿𝝀 = √𝟐 ∙ (𝟏 − 𝒘𝜿𝝀)       [1.6] 
 In this way, we transform the correlation weights𝑤𝜅𝜆 taking values within the interval [−1,1] to 
distance weights𝑑𝜅𝜆 taking values within the interval[0,2]. The above formula for distance 
estimation implies:  
 strong positive correlation weight⇨ small distance 
 weak correlation weight (positive or negative) ⇨ high distance 
 negative correlation weight⇨ very high distance 
 
The next step is to compute the MST [62] from the newly constructed network with distance 
weights 𝑑𝜅𝜆.   
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Figure 1: The MST subgraph from the graph with distance weights𝑑𝜅𝜆 = √2 ∙ (1 − 𝑤𝜅𝜆) , 
Where 𝑤𝜅𝜆 is the correlation weight, estimated with the standard Person correlation index. 
 
 
The MST is the subgraph (above Figure 1) that: 
•   give us the opportunity to connect in the entire network all the existed nodes, and 
•   provides us with the minimum length (based on distance weights) 
More specifically in every step we linked the nodes with the distance at a lowest level, in this 
thesis the highest positive correlation, taking into consideration that we don’t have cyclic 
subgraphs.  
When all nodes are appeared in subgraph then the process of MST algorithm stops. 
 
Based on the MST, we can identify the so called “core banks”, through which we can monitor the 
whole banking network. The algorithm used to identify the core banks has been adopted from 
Papadimitriou et al. (2013) and it is described briefly below:  
 
Set initially: = ∅ , where M is the set of the so called “Monitored Nodes” 
Step 1: Repeat until all nodes are monitored. That means: 𝑀 = {1,2,3, … , 𝑁} 
Step 2: Find node𝑚, which is the node with maximal weighted degree in the MST. That is: 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚 = max
𝑖=1,2,…,𝑁
{𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖} , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖 = ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑗  𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑆𝑇      [1.7] 
 
Step 3: Remove node 𝑚 from the MST. That means: 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚 = 0 
Step 4: Adjust the weighted degree of all neighboring nodes accordingly. 
That means lower the weighted degree of each neighbor node 𝑗 according to formula: 
 
𝑁𝑒𝑤 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑗 = 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑗 − 𝑑𝑚𝑗  [1.8] 
 
Step 5: Update the set 𝑀 of “Monitored Nodes”: 
 𝑀 = 𝑀 ∪ {𝑚} (the bank identified as “core” is of course monitored) 
 𝑀 = 𝑀 ∪ {𝑗}, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑗 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑑𝑚𝑗 > 0 (all banks 𝑗 which were neighbors to the core bank 
𝑚, are considered as “monitored” via 𝑚) 
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Based on the linkages and correlations between banks, we take as output a subset of the whole 
network which we called “Core Banks”. The aforementioned banks give us the insight about the 
potential future contagion alerts. Central Banks can focus on assessing and supervising the 
subgraphs of the “core banks” in terms of any kind of distress and in case of a warning is 
recognized then they use precautionary plans in order to minimize the possible contagion to all 
banks that are “near” to the core firms.  
 
4. Data 
The reliability and the quality of data play an important role in the process of our analysis. The 
“core” source of our data is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDCI). The FDIC preserves 
and promotes with transparency public confidence in the U.S. Financial System by insuring 
deposits in banks and thrift institutions for at least $250,000 by identifying, monitoring in details 
and addressing risks to the deposit insurance fund. Also, it contributes to limiting and identifying 
the effect on the economy and the financial system when a bank or thrift institution fails. An 
independent and new agency o the federal government, the FDIC was created in 1933. Moreover 
FDCI has a tradition of distinguished reliable services to the public as well.  Below, it is important 
to mention the six cores and crucial values that lead the whole team of FDIC: 
 
Table 1: 
 
Competence: 
High dedication and diverse workforce that is empowered to achieve 
the outstanding results 
Teamwork: Intense Communication and collaboration effectively with one another 
Effectiveness: 
Response quickly and successfully to risks in insured depository 
institutions and the financial system 
Accountability: 
Aiming to be accountable to each other and more specifically to 
stakeholders to operate in a financially responsible and operationally in 
an effective manner 
Fairness: 
High Respect for individual viewpoints and treat one another and 
stakeholders with impartiality, dignity, and trust 
 
 
We selected 46 of the largest U.S. Banks, based on their Market Capitalization, from the latest 
research of FDCI. More specifically, FDIC 2019 announced the 100 largest US banks, based on 
their Market Capitalization. We identified (and selected to analyse) 46 of 100 banks, which are 
present in all previous quarters for the time interval from 2005 to 2018.From now on, we shall 
refer to these 46 banks of our analysis as “common banks”, in sense that they are common in all 
years examined. 
 
As the goal of this dissertation is to study the dynamics of profitability correlations among US 
Banks, we construct and analyze 3 kinds of networks based on: 
 ROA 
 ROE 
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 NIMY 
We use Quarterly data (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4 ) from FDCI for a time interval from 2005 to 2018 as 
follows: We divide the whole time interval from 2015Q1 to 2018Q4 into 7 periods (with duration 
of 2 years each), estimating and analyzing the corresponding constructed network for each 
profitability index (ROA, ROE, NIMY). We present the breakdown of the data for analysis in Table 
2. 
 
Table 2:  Breakdown of the 2005-2018 data for analysis, in terms of ROA, ROE and NIMY 
correlation networks 
 Period 1 
From: 
2005Q1 
To: 
2006Q4 
Period 2 
From: 
2007Q1 
To: 
2008Q4 
Period 3 
From: 
2009Q1 
To: 
2010Q4 
Period 4 
From: 
2011Q1 
To: 
2012Q4 
Period 5 
From: 
2013Q1 
To: 
2014Q4 
Period 6 
From: 
2015Q1 
To: 2016Q4 
Period 7 
From: 
2017Q1 
To: 
2018Q4 
ROA 
roa-
network-1 
roa-
network-2 
roa-
network-3 
roa-
network-4 
roa-
network-5 
roa-
network-6 
roa-
network-7 
ROE 
roe-
network-1 
roe-
network-2 
roe-
network-3 
roe-
network-4 
roe-
network-5 
roe-
network-6 
roe-
network-7 
NIMY 
nimy-
network-1 
nimy-
network-2 
nimy-
network-3 
nimy-
network-4 
nimy-
network-5 
nimy-
network-6 
nimy-
network-7 
 
We present below the significance of the 3 selected profitability indices, namely: ROA, ROE and 
NIMY. 
 
Return on Assets(𝑹𝑶𝑨 =
𝑵𝒆𝒕 𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆
𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔
) [1.9] 
ROA is an important indicator of how profitable a company is relative to its total assets 
accordingly. Also it gives a manager, investor, or financial analyst guidance as to how efficient a 
company's management is at using its assets in order to generate earnings. The return on assets 
is displayed as a percentage. Moreover, ROA is best used when comparing similar companies or 
comparing a company to its previous performance as well. For public and large companies can 
vary substantially and will be highly dependent on the industry accordingly.  
More specifically the higher the ROA ratio the better because the firm is earning more money on 
less investment and this is what we want. The Total assets ratio is meant to be the sum of its total 
liabilities and shareholder's equity. Both of these types of financing are also used to fund the 
operations of the company. In many cases a company's assets are either funded by debt or equity 
and a significant number of analysts and investors disregard the cost of acquiring the asset by 
adding back interest expense in the formula for Return on Assets. 
 
Table 3:Factors which may affect ROA 
Control Expenses 
One of the reasons for an increase (or a decrease) in the 
percentage of return on assets is control of business expenses. 
When a business earns more than it is spending it may expect 
to improve and even increase its return on assets. This is not as 
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it is clear a simple task to undertake because spending less 
would possibly decrease sales volume. A “clever” approach is 
to invest in those assets or undertake those expenses that are 
extremely necessary for business operation but it depends on 
each type of business. 
Increased Asset Turnover  
(the amount of sales 
generated by an asset) 
An increase/decrease in asset turnover means an 
increase/decrease in sales with the same number of assets or 
maintaining sales with a reduced number of assets as well. This 
happens when a firm refrains from spending too much on 
exorbitant equipment or purchasing too much inventory 
accordingly (increase sight). By leasing or renting equipment or 
outsourcing some jobs, a business is able to maximize its asset 
turnover. 
Increase/Decrease in Sales 
Lowering the expenses and increasing the sales and vice versa, 
this has a positive/negative impact on ROA. 
Debt Capital 
(when the money borrowed 
from lenders and investors as 
a loan or venture capital as 
well) 
When a firm pays more to finance debt capital than it is getting 
from investing this debt capital the ROA is getting lower as well 
and vice versa. 
 
Return on Equity (𝑹𝑶𝑬 =
𝑵𝒆𝒕 𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆
𝑨𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒔’ 𝑬𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒕𝒚
)[1.10] 
The ROE is a measure of financial performance as ROA calculated by dividing net income by 
shareholders' equity. Due to the fact that shareholders' equity is equal to a company’s assets 
minus its debt, ROE could be considered as the return on net assets. In other words, it measures 
how effectively management is using a company’s assets to create profits. In other words, ROE 
can measure the ability of a firm to generate profits from its shareholders investments in the 
company or how much profit each dollar of common stockholders' equity generates accordingly. 
 
The main difference with ROA is that the way that a company's debt is taken into account. When 
the debt doesn’t exist the shareholder equity and the company's total assets will be equal and 
their ROE and ROA would also be the same. On the other side if that company takes account on 
financial leverage, its ROE would rise above its ROA. By taking on debt, a company increases its 
assets thanks to the cash that comes in the balance sheet. But when shareholder equity equals 
assets minus total debt, a company decreases its equity by increasing debt accordingly. As result 
when debt increases then the equity shrinks, and since shareholder equity is the ROE's 
denominator, its ROE, in turn, gets a boost. 
 
Table 4:Factors which may affect ROE 
The role of Management 
The firm’s earning a profit on its assets and the profits are 
increasing over time. More specifically, if you reinvest the 
money in the company, then the total assets are increased, 
which in turn, increases shareholders' equity. If ROE get 
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decreased that’s often a sign management is making poor 
reinvestment decisions or not generating enough income 
based on standards. 
 Financial Leverage 
Increase or Decrease the Amount of Debt capital relative to its 
equity capital, we have an increase or decrease to ROE. 
Increase/Decrease Profits 
For the case of increase, profits are in the numerator of the 
return on equity ratio, so increasing profits relative to equity 
increases a company's return on equity. Increasing profits does 
not necessarily have to come from selling lot of products. It can 
also come from increasing prices of each product sold or 
lowering the cost of goods sold, and reducing its overhead 
expenses, or a combination of the above. 
Asset Turnover (as ROA) and 
Lower Taxes 
The role of taxes and legal environment has an influential role 
to the whole process of controlling and organizing the 
distribution of profits and debt/equity accordingly. 
Distribute Idle Cash 
Idle cash in excess of what the business has the need to 
continue operations reduces the apparent profitability of the 
company when measured by return on equity accordingly. 
Distributing idle cash to shareholders is effectively a clever way 
to leverage a company and more specifically boost its return 
on equity. 
 
Net Interest Margin (𝑵𝑰𝑴𝒀 =
𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑹𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒏𝒔 − 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒔
𝑨𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔
)[1.11] 
The Net interest Margin is a ratio that measures how successful a firm is at investing its funds in 
comparison to its expenses on the same investments accordingly. When a negative value exists, 
it denotes that the firm has not made an optimal investment decision because interest expenses 
are above the amount of returns generated by investments. More specifically Net interest margin 
is a profitability indicator from which the investors really need to understand before they make 
certain investments. 
 
Net interest margin is expressed a percentage and it is one of the most important profitability 
indicators of an organization, showing how much it earns on interest from its credit products or 
loans, mortgages that are compared to the interest it pays out on things like savings accounts and 
certificates of deposit (CDs). Inversely, when we have a positive net interest margin that 
percentage indicates a bank invests efficiently based on this metric. 
 
Table 5:Factors which may affect NIMY 
Supply - Demand for Loans 
In the case of the demand for savings increases relative to the 
demand for loans then the net interest margin will get 
decreased. The opposite is true if the demand for loans is 
higher relative to savings as well. 
Business model differs 
among firms 
The wide range of business models must be tailor made for the 
needs among firms and sometimes the “wrong” choose of a 
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business model does effect the nimy according to its process of 
loans. 
The fund’s manager role for 
investment decision-making 
The “core” person that should control the whole process based 
on nimy is the fund manager and his/her crucial paths of 
investment decisions. 
Interest expenses exceed the 
investment earnings 
If the previous exists, the nimy gets decreased according to the 
ration of nimy. 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
Given that: 
 “Core” banks are identified based on MST 
 “Influential” banks are identified based on Weighted Degree 
 
We will try to answer the following question: 
Question: Are “Core” banks also “Influential” banks? At which percentage? 
 
We present below the results for each category (core, influential-positive, and influential-
negative) in descending order of “power”. 
 
 
 
Table 6:Results estimated based on ROA 
 
Core Banks 
 
high 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝜅 on MST, 
as calculated on the network 
with distance weights 𝑑𝜅𝜆 =
√2 ∙ (1 − 𝑤𝜅𝜆) 
Influential Banks 
(positive) 
 
high 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝜅
+ on the network 
 with Pearson correlation weights 𝑤𝜅𝜆 
Influential Banks 
(negative) 
 
low 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝜅
− on the network 
 with Pearson correlation weights 𝑤𝜅𝜆 
ro
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2
0
0
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1
 -
 2
0
0
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Cathay Bank, Los Angeles First Nebraska Bank, Valley Banco Santander Puerto Rico, San Juan 
Bank of Hawaii, Honolulu Columbus State Bank, Columbus 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National 
Association, Columbus 
State Street Bank and Trust 
Company, Boston 
First Hawaiian Bank, Honolulu MidFirst Bank, Oklahoma City 
Commerce Bank, Geneva UBS Bank USA, Salt Lake City Sterling Federal Bank, F.S.B., Sterling 
Deutsche Bank Trust Company 
Americas, New York 
Banco Santander Puerto Rico, San 
Juan 
Regions Bank, Birmingham 
First Tennessee Bank, National 
Association, Memphis 
United National Bank, Cairo New York Community Bank, Westbury 
Prosperity Bank, El Campo Prosperity Bank, El Campo 
State Street Bank and Trust Company, 
Boston 
Regions Bank, Birmingham Sterling Federal Bank, F.S.B., Sterling UBS Bank USA, Salt Lake City 
Columbus State Bank, Columbus 
City First Bank of D.C., National 
Association, Washington 
Discover Bank, Greenwood 
Associated Bank, National 
Association, Green Bay 
New York Community Bank, Westbury First Hawaiian Bank, Honolulu 
ro a
-
n
e
tw o
r k- 2
: 
2
0
0
7 Q 1
 -
 
2
0
0
8 Q 4
 First Hope Bank, A National 
Banking Association, Hope 
Prosperity Bank, El Campo 
First Hope Bank, A National Banking 
Association, Hope 
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Valley National Bank, Passaic 
Associated Bank, National Association 
,Green Bay 
South Central Bank, National Association, 
Chicago 
Old National Bank, Evansville Cathay Bank, Los Angeles MidFirst Bank, Oklahoma City 
UMB Bank, National Association, 
Kansas City 
State Farm Bank, F.S.B., Bloomington First Citizens Bank, Luverne 
State Street Bank and Trust 
Company, Boston 
Webster Bank, National Association, 
Waterbury 
Columbus State Bank, Columbus 
Webster Bank, National 
Association, Waterbury 
Valley National Bank, Passaic First Hawaiian Bank, Honolulu 
Bank of America, National 
Association, Charlotte 
U.S. Bank National Association, 
Cincinnati 
Iberiabank, Lafayette 
KeyBank National Association, 
Cleveland 
Umpqua Bank, Roseburg 
City First Bank of D.C., National 
Association, Washington 
Commerce Bank, Geneva Discover Bank, Greenwood 
UMB Bank, National Association, Kansas 
City 
E*TRADE Bank, Arlington Silicon Valley Bank, Santa Clara Old National Bank, Evansville 
ro
a-
n
e
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o
rk
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2
0
0
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1
0
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MidFirst Bank, Oklahoma City 
KeyBank National Association, 
Cleveland 
Commerce Bank, Geneva 
Commerce Bank, Geneva 
First Tennessee Bank, National 
Association, Memphis 
Sterling Federal Bank, F.S.B., Sterling 
Regions Bank, Birmingham UBS Bank USA, Salt Lake City 
South Central Bank, National Association, 
Chicago 
Umpqua Bank, Roseburg E*TRADE Bank, Arlington First Hawaiian Bank, Honolulu 
Fifth Third Bank, Cincinnati Prosperity Bank, El Campo Arvest Bank, Fayetteville 
The Northern Trust Company, 
Chicago 
Webster Bank, National Association, 
Waterbury 
The Northern Trust Company, Chicago 
KeyBank National Association, 
Cleveland 
SunTrust Bank, Atlanta 
UMB Bank, National Association, Kansas 
City 
First Nebraska Bank, Valley Columbus State Bank, Columbus Fifth Third Bank, Cincinnati 
Valley National Bank, Passaic 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National 
Association, Columbus 
Iberiabank, Lafayette 
Banco Santander Puerto Rico, San 
Juan 
U.S. Bank National Association, 
Cincinnati 
Associated Bank, National Association, 
Green Bay 
ro
a-
n
e
tw
o
rk
-4
: 
2
0
1
1
Q
1
 -
 2
0
1
2
Q
4
 
United National Bank, Cairo UBS Bank USA, Salt Lake City E*TRADE Bank, Arlington 
E*TRADE Bank, Arlington 
Associated Bank, National 
Association, Green Bay 
KeyBank National Association, Cleveland 
First Citizens Bank, Luverne Umpqua Bank, Roseburg 
Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, 
New York 
Sterling Federal Bank, F.S.B., 
Sterling 
Cathay Bank, Los Angeles Columbus State Bank, Columbus 
Bank of Hawaii, Honolulu SunTrust Bank, Atlanta Sterling Federal Bank, F.S.B., Sterling 
First National Bank, Hamilton 
U.S. Bank National Association, 
Cincinnati 
State Street Bank and Trust Company, 
Boston 
First Tennessee Bank, National 
Association, Memphis 
Fifth Third Bank, Cincinnati 
First Tennessee Bank, National 
Association, Memphis 
Cathay Bank, Los Angeles 
Webster Bank, National Association, 
Waterbury 
Valley National Bank, Passaic 
UBS Bank USA, Salt Lake City Regions Bank, Birmingham Arvest Bank, Fayetteville 
MidFirst Bank, Oklahoma City Old National Bank, Evansville Silicon Valley Bank,Santa Clara 
ro
a-
n
e
tw
o
rk
-5
: 
2
0
1
3
Q
1
 -
 2
0
1
4
Q
4
 First Tennessee Bank, National 
Association, Memphis 
City First Bank of D.C., National 
Association, Washington 
Commerce Bank, Geneva 
UMB Bank, National Association, 
Kansas City 
U.S. Bank National Association, 
Cincinnati 
South Central Bank, National Association, 
Chicago 
United National Bank, Cairo New York Community Bank, Westbury Prosperity Bank, El Campo 
First Midwest Bank of Dexter, 
Dexter 
Fifth Third Bank, Cincinnati E*TRADE Bank, Arlington 
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Columbus State Bank, Columbus 
Associated Bank, National 
Association, Green Bay 
Webster Bank, National Association, 
Waterbury 
The Huntington National Bank, 
Columbus 
Columbus State Bank, Columbus Iberiabank, Lafayette 
Cathay Bank, Los Angeles Flagstar Bank, FSB, Troy United National Bank, Cairo 
First Hawaiian Bank, Honolulu 
USAA Federal Savings Bank, San 
Antonio 
First Citizens Bank, Luverne 
Associated Bank, National 
Association, Green Bay 
Bank of America, National 
Association, Charlotte 
First Tennessee Bank, National 
Association, Memphis 
First Citizens Bank, Luverne Old National Bank, Evansville SunTrust Bank, Atlanta 
ro
a-
n
e
tw
o
rk
-6
: 
2
0
1
5
Q
1
 -
 2
0
1
6
Q
4
 
Associated Bank, National 
Association, Green Bay 
UMB Bank, National Association, 
Kansas City 
Prosperity Bank, El Campo 
Umpqua Bank, Roseburg Iberiabank, Lafayette Banco Santander Puerto Rico, San Juan 
Iberiabank, Lafayette First Bank, Strasburg 
Webster Bank, National Association, 
Waterbury 
Discover Bank, Greenwood UBS Bank USA, Salt Lake City KeyBank National Association, Cleveland 
Silicon Valley Bank, Santa Clara Regions Bank, Birmingham USAA Federal Savings Bank, San Antonio 
Bank of Hawaii, Honolulu 
First Tennessee Bank, National 
Association, Memphis 
United National Bank, Cairo 
Regions Bank, Birmingham Bank of Hawaii, Honolulu Discover Bank, Greenwood 
UMB Bank, National Association, 
Kansas City 
First National Bank, Hamilton U.S. Bank National Association, Cincinnati 
Banco Santander Puerto Rico, San 
Juan 
Columbus State Bank, Columbus Sterling Federal Bank, F.S.B., Sterling 
U.S. Bank National Association, 
Cincinnati 
City First Bank of D.C., National 
Association, Washington 
UMB Bank, National Association, Kansas 
City 
ro
a-
n
e
tw
o
rk
-7
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2
0
1
7
Q
1
 -
 2
0
1
8
Q
4
 
New York Community Bank, 
Westbury 
Silicon Valley Bank, Santa Clara First Nebraska Bank, Valley 
First National Bank, Hamilton 
Bank of America, National 
Association, Charlotte 
New York Community Bank, Westbury 
MidFirst Bank, Oklahoma City 
KeyBank National Association, 
Cleveland 
City First Bank of D.C., National 
Association, Washington 
Banco Santander Puerto Rico, San 
Juan 
Bank of Hawaii, Honolulu Banco Santander Puerto Rico, San Juan 
Flagstar Bank, FSB, Troy UBS Bank USA, Salt Lake City First Hawaiian Bank, Honolulu 
Iberiabank, Lafayette 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National 
Association, Columbus 
Cathay Bank, Los Angeles 
Silicon Valley Bank, Santa Clara 
Associated Bank, National 
Association, Green Bay 
Commerce Bank, Geneva 
Old National Bank, Evansville First Bank, Strasburg Discover Bank, Greenwood 
Arvest Bank, Fayetteville Cathay Bank, Los Angeles 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National 
Association, Columbus 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National 
Association, Columbus 
United National Bank, Cairo 
Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, 
New York 
Table 7:Results estimated based on ROE 
 
Core Banks 
 
high 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝜅 on MST, 
as calculated on the network 
with distance weights 𝑑𝜅𝜆 =
√2 ∙ (1 − 𝑤𝜅𝜆) 
Influential Banks 
(positive) 
 
high 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝜅
+ on the network 
 with Pearson correlation weights 𝑤𝜅𝜆 
Influential Banks 
(negative) 
 
low 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝜅
− on the network 
 with Pearson correlation weights 𝑤𝜅𝜆 
ro e
-
n
e
tw o
r k- 1
: 
2
0
0
5 Q 1
 -
 
2
0
0
6 Q 4
 South Central Bank, National 
Association,Chicago 
Prosperity Bank,El Campo UBS Bank USA,Salt Lake City 
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Cathay Bank,Los Angeles 
Banco Santander Puerto Rico,San 
Juan 
First Hawaiian Bank,Honolulu 
KeyBank National 
Association,Cleveland 
Columbus State Bank,Columbus 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National 
Association,Columbus 
United National Bank,Cairo Commerce Bank,Geneva 
State Street Bank and Trust 
Company,Boston 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National 
Association,Columbus 
Cathay Bank,Los Angeles First Midwest Bank of Dexter,Dexter 
State Street Bank and Trust 
Company,Boston 
Sterling Federal Bank, F.S.B.,Sterling Silicon Valley Bank,Santa Clara 
Columbus State Bank,Columbus First Nebraska Bank,Valley 
UMB Bank, National Association,Kansas 
City 
Bank of Hawaii,Honolulu MidFirst Bank,Oklahoma City The Northern Trust Company,Chicago 
The Northern Trust Company,Chicago New York Community Bank,Westbury Banco Santander Puerto Rico,San Juan 
SunTrust Bank,Atlanta 
Associated Bank, National 
Association,Green Bay 
United National Bank,Cairo 
ro
e
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0
0
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0
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First Hope Bank, A National Banking 
Association,Hope 
Associated Bank, National 
Association,Green Bay 
MidFirst Bank,Oklahoma City 
Discover Bank,Greenwood Prosperity Bank,El Campo 
First Hope Bank, A National Banking 
Association,Hope 
The Northern Trust Company,Chicago Cathay Bank,Los Angeles 
South Central Bank, National 
Association,Chicago 
South Central Bank, National 
Association,Chicago 
Valley National Bank,Passaic Columbus State Bank,Columbus 
Cathay Bank,Los Angeles State Farm Bank, F.S.B.,Bloomington First Citizens Bank,Luverne 
The Huntington National 
Bank,Columbus 
Webster Bank, National 
Association,Waterbury 
City First Bank of D.C., National 
Association,Washington 
MidFirst Bank,Oklahoma City Umpqua Bank,Roseburg 
UMB Bank, National Association,Kansas 
City 
Regions Bank,Birmingham First Bank,Strasburg Iberiabank,Lafayette 
Bank of America, National 
Association,Charlotte 
Arvest Bank,Fayetteville Old National Bank,Evansville 
State Farm Bank, F.S.B.,Bloomington 
Deutsche Bank Trust Company 
Americas,New York 
Sterling Federal Bank, F.S.B.,Sterling 
ro
e
-n
e
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o
rk
-3
: 
2
0
0
9
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1
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 2
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Commerce Bank,Geneva 
First Tennessee Bank, National 
Association,Memphis 
Commerce Bank,Geneva 
USAA Federal Savings Bank,San 
Antonio 
KeyBank National 
Association,Cleveland 
Sterling Federal Bank, F.S.B.,Sterling 
Banco Santander Puerto Rico,San Juan Prosperity Bank,El Campo The Northern Trust Company,Chicago 
U.S. Bank National 
Association,Cincinnati 
Webster Bank, National 
Association,Waterbury 
Arvest Bank,Fayetteville 
MidFirst Bank,Oklahoma City SunTrust Bank,Atlanta First Hawaiian Bank,Honolulu 
City First Bank of D.C., National 
Association,Washington 
E*TRADE Bank,Arlington 
South Central Bank, National 
Association,Chicago 
UMB Bank, National 
Association,Kansas City 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National 
Association,Columbus 
Fifth Third Bank,Cincinnati 
The Northern Trust Company,Chicago New York Community Bank,Westbury Iberiabank,Lafayette 
First Tennessee Bank, National 
Association,Memphis 
The Huntington National 
Bank,Columbus 
Associated Bank, National 
Association,Green Bay 
Umpqua Bank,Roseburg Umpqua Bank,Roseburg Banco Santander Puerto Rico,San Juan 
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e
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e
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0
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E*TRADE Bank,Arlington 
Associated Bank, National 
Association,Green Bay 
Columbus State Bank,Columbus 
First Hope Bank, A National Banking 
Association,Hope 
UBS Bank USA,Salt Lake City KeyBank National Association,Cleveland 
First Bank,Strasburg Cathay Bank,Los Angeles E*TRADE Bank,Arlington 
First National Bank,Hamilton Umpqua Bank,Roseburg Silicon Valley Bank,Santa Clara 
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First Citizens Bank,Luverne Regions Bank,Birmingham 
Deutsche Bank Trust Company 
Americas,New York 
MidFirst Bank,Oklahoma City 
Webster Bank, National 
Association,Waterbury 
Sterling Federal Bank, F.S.B.,Sterling 
Cathay Bank,Los Angeles SunTrust Bank,Atlanta Valley National Bank,Passaic 
State Street Bank and Trust 
Company,Boston 
Fifth Third Bank,Cincinnati 
First Tennessee Bank, National 
Association,Memphis 
The Northern Trust Company,Chicago The Northern Trust Company,Chicago Arvest Bank,Fayetteville 
Banco Santander Puerto Rico,San Juan 
Bank of America, National 
Association,Charlotte 
South Central Bank, National 
Association,Chicago 
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e
-n
e
tw
o
rk
-5
: 
2
0
1
3
Q
1
 -
 2
0
1
4
Q
4
 
United National Bank,Cairo 
City First Bank of D.C., National 
Association,Washington 
South Central Bank, National 
Association,Chicago 
Old National Bank,Evansville 
Associated Bank, National 
Association,Green Bay 
Commerce Bank,Geneva 
E*TRADE Bank,Arlington Fifth Third Bank,Cincinnati E*TRADE Bank,Arlington 
Associated Bank, National 
Association,Green Bay 
U.S. Bank National 
Association,Cincinnati 
Cathay Bank,Los Angeles 
Silicon Valley Bank,Santa Clara New York Community Bank,Westbury 
Webster Bank, National 
Association,Waterbury 
City First Bank of D.C., National 
Association,Washington 
The Huntington National 
Bank,Columbus 
Iberiabank,Lafayette 
Arvest Bank,Fayetteville Flagstar Bank, FSB,Troy Silicon Valley Bank,Santa Clara 
SunTrust Bank,Atlanta 
USAA Federal Savings Bank,San 
Antonio 
Prosperity Bank,El Campo 
First Midwest Bank of Dexter,Dexter 
Bank of America, National 
Association,Charlotte 
Bank of Hawaii,Honolulu 
Regions Bank,Birmingham Discover Bank,Greenwood First Hawaiian Bank,Honolulu 
ro
e
-n
e
tw
o
rk
-6
: 
2
0
1
5
Q
1
 -
 2
0
1
6
Q
4
 
UMB Bank, National 
Association,Kansas City 
First Bank,Strasburg Prosperity Bank,El Campo 
First Hope Bank, A National Banking 
Association,Hope 
UBS Bank USA,Salt Lake City Banco Santander Puerto Rico,San Juan 
Banco Santander Puerto Rico,San Juan Regions Bank,Birmingham U.S. Bank National Association,Cincinnati 
First Citizens Bank,Luverne Iberiabank,Lafayette USAA Federal Savings Bank,San Antonio 
Discover Bank,Greenwood 
First Tennessee Bank, National 
Association,Memphis 
KeyBank National Association,Cleveland 
Iberiabank,Lafayette Columbus State Bank,Columbus Discover Bank,Greenwood 
Flagstar Bank, FSB,Troy 
UMB Bank, National 
Association,Kansas City 
Sterling Federal Bank, F.S.B.,Sterling 
City First Bank of D.C., National 
Association,Washington 
Bank of Hawaii,Honolulu State Farm Bank, F.S.B.,Bloomington 
Old National Bank,Evansville First Hawaiian Bank,Honolulu First Hawaiian Bank,Honolulu 
U.S. Bank National 
Association,Cincinnati 
Arvest Bank,Fayetteville 
UMB Bank, National Association,Kansas 
City 
ro
e
-n
e
tw
o
rk
-7
: 
2
0
1
7
Q
1
 -
 2
0
1
8
Q
4
 
City First Bank of D.C., National 
Association,Washington 
Silicon Valley Bank,Santa Clara First Nebraska Bank,Valley 
MidFirst Bank,Oklahoma City 
KeyBank National 
Association,Cleveland 
New York Community Bank,Westbury 
Banco Santander Puerto Rico,San Juan 
Bank of America, National 
Association,Charlotte 
City First Bank of D.C., National 
Association,Washington 
State Farm Bank, F.S.B.,Bloomington Bank of Hawaii,Honolulu Banco Santander Puerto Rico,San Juan 
Iberiabank,Lafayette 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National 
Association,Columbus 
Cathay Bank,Los Angeles 
First Nebraska Bank,Valley Discover Bank,Greenwood Valley National Bank,Passaic 
State Street Bank and Trust 
Company,Boston 
UBS Bank USA,Salt Lake City First Hawaiian Bank,Honolulu 
United National Bank,Cairo United National Bank,Cairo UBS Bank USA,Salt Lake City 
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First National Bank,Hamilton First Bank,Strasburg 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National 
Association,Columbus 
Silicon Valley Bank,Santa Clara Cathay Bank,Los Angeles 
UMB Bank, National Association,Kansas 
City 
Table 8:Results estimated based on NIMY 
 
Core Banks 
 
high 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝜅 on MST, 
as calculated on the network 
with distance weights 𝑑𝜅𝜆 = √2 ∙ (1 − 𝑤𝜅𝜆) 
Influential Banks 
(positive) 
 
high 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝜅
+ on the network 
 with Pearson correlation weights 𝑤𝜅𝜆 
Influential Banks 
(negative) 
 
low 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝜅
− on the network 
 with Pearson correlation weights 𝑤𝜅𝜆 
n
im
y-
n
e
tw
o
rk
-1
: 
2
0
0
5
Q
1
 -
 2
0
0
6
Q
4
 
Prosperity Bank,El Campo 
South Central Bank, National 
Association,Chicago 
Silicon Valley Bank,Santa Clara 
First Midwest Bank of Dexter,Dexter 
Bank of America, National 
Association,Charlotte 
State Street Bank and Trust 
Company,Boston 
Cathay Bank,Los Angeles Valley National Bank,Passaic UBS Bank USA,Salt Lake City 
The Huntington National Bank,Columbus 
U.S. Bank National 
Association,Cincinnati 
E*TRADE Bank,Arlington 
South Central Bank, National 
Association,Chicago 
Bank of Hawaii,Honolulu United National Bank,Cairo 
The Northern Trust Company,Chicago 
USAA Federal Savings Bank,San 
Antonio 
Old National Bank,Evansville 
Banco Santander Puerto Rico,San Juan New York Community Bank,Westbury First Hawaiian Bank,Honolulu 
First Hope Bank, A National Banking 
Association,Hope 
First Nebraska Bank,Valley Flagstar Bank, FSB,Troy 
UBS Bank USA,Salt Lake City 
First Tennessee Bank, National 
Association,Memphis 
State Farm Bank, F.S.B.,Bloomington 
Flagstar Bank, FSB,Troy Fifth Third Bank,Cincinnati Sterling Federal Bank, F.S.B.,Sterling 
nimy-
network-
3: 
2009Q1 - 
2010Q4 
Sterling Federal Bank, F.S.B.,Sterling First Citizens Bank,Luverne Regions Bank,Birmingham 
KeyBank National Association,Cleveland 
First Hope Bank, A National Banking 
Association,Hope 
Silicon Valley Bank,Santa Clara 
First Bank,Strasburg MidFirst Bank,Oklahoma City First Midwest Bank of Dexter,Dexter 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National 
Association,Columbus 
Bank of Hawaii,Honolulu Cathay Bank,Los Angeles 
Iberiabank,Lafayette Flagstar Bank, FSB,Troy Commerce Bank,Geneva 
First Hope Bank, A National Banking 
Association,Hope 
USAA Federal Savings Bank,San 
Antonio 
United National Bank,Cairo 
Bank of America, National Association,Charlotte 
U.S. Bank National 
Association,Cincinnati 
KeyBank National Association,Cleveland 
First Tennessee Bank, National 
Association,Memphis 
First National Bank,Hamilton 
Webster Bank, National 
Association,Waterbury 
Webster Bank, National Association,Waterbury Old National Bank,Evansville Prosperity Bank,El Campo 
Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas,New 
York 
Banco Santander Puerto Rico,San 
Juan 
UBS Bank USA,Salt Lake City 
n
im
y-
n
e
tw
o
rk
-3
: 
2
0
0
9
Q
1
 -
 2
0
1
0
Q
4
 Sterling Federal Bank, F.S.B.,Sterling 
The Huntington National 
Bank,Columbus 
Silicon Valley Bank,Santa Clara 
Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas,New 
York 
Columbus State Bank,Columbus The Northern Trust Company,Chicago 
Umpqua Bank,Roseburg First Bank,Strasburg 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National 
Association,Columbus 
E*TRADE Bank,Arlington SunTrust Bank,Atlanta Commerce Bank,Geneva 
Flagstar Bank, FSB,Troy 
Webster Bank, National 
Association,Waterbury 
First Hawaiian Bank,Honolulu 
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UBS Bank USA,Salt Lake City 
Banco Santander Puerto Rico,San 
Juan 
Associated Bank, National 
Association,Green Bay 
Regions Bank,Birmingham Valley National Bank,Passaic Bank of Hawaii,Honolulu 
First National Bank,Hamilton 
USAA Federal Savings Bank,San 
Antonio 
Deutsche Bank Trust Company 
Americas,New York 
First Bank,Strasburg Fifth Third Bank,Cincinnati 
UMB Bank, National Association,Kansas 
City 
Fifth Third Bank,Cincinnati State Farm Bank, F.S.B.,Bloomington Flagstar Bank, FSB,Troy 
n
im
y-
n
e
tw
o
rk
-4
: 
2
0
1
1
Q
1
 -
 2
0
1
2
Q
4
 
UBS Bank USA,Salt Lake City SunTrust Bank,Atlanta Silicon Valley Bank,Santa Clara 
UMB Bank, National Association,Kansas City 
Webster Bank, National 
Association,Waterbury 
MidFirst Bank,Oklahoma City 
State Street Bank and Trust Company,Boston E*TRADE Bank,Arlington 
The Huntington National 
Bank,Columbus 
Valley National Bank,Passaic First Hawaiian Bank,Honolulu Old National Bank,Evansville 
United National Bank,Cairo 
First Tennessee Bank, National 
Association,Memphis 
Flagstar Bank, FSB,Troy 
First Hope Bank, A National Banking 
Association,Hope 
Bank of Hawaii,Honolulu 
Deutsche Bank Trust Company 
Americas,New York 
Silicon Valley Bank,Santa Clara 
USAA Federal Savings Bank,San 
Antonio 
The Northern Trust Company,Chicago 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National 
Association,Columbus 
State Farm Bank, F.S.B.,Bloomington Cathay Bank,Los Angeles 
Bank of America, National Association,Charlotte First Citizens Bank,Luverne United National Bank,Cairo 
USAA Federal Savings Bank,San Antonio 
U.S. Bank National 
Association,Cincinnati 
UBS Bank USA,Salt Lake City 
n
im
y-
n
e
tw
o
rk
-5
: 
2
0
1
3
Q
1
 -
 2
0
1
4
Q
4
 
First Bank,Strasburg 
State Street Bank and Trust 
Company,Boston 
Flagstar Bank, FSB,Troy 
The Huntington National Bank,Columbus 
Deutsche Bank Trust Company 
Americas,New York 
E*TRADE Bank,Arlington 
Webster Bank, National Association,Waterbury 
The Huntington National 
Bank,Columbus 
Banco Santander Puerto Rico,San Juan 
Flagstar Bank, FSB,Troy Fifth Third Bank,Cincinnati First Citizens Bank,Luverne 
Commerce Bank,Geneva SunTrust Bank,Atlanta 
City First Bank of D.C., National 
Association,Washington 
Umpqua Bank,Roseburg State Farm Bank, F.S.B.,Bloomington 
South Central Bank, National 
Association,Chicago 
Arvest Bank,Fayetteville 
U.S. Bank National 
Association,Cincinnati 
Old National Bank,Evansville 
First National Bank,Hamilton 
Associated Bank, National 
Association,Green Bay 
Umpqua Bank,Roseburg 
First Citizens Bank,Luverne Columbus State Bank,Columbus 
U.S. Bank National 
Association,Cincinnati 
Associated Bank, National Association,Green 
Bay 
First Hope Bank, A National Banking 
Association,Hope 
Fifth Third Bank,Cincinnati 
n
im
y-
n
e
tw
o
rk
-6
: 
2
0
1
5
Q
1
 -
 2
0
1
6
Q
4
 
First Nebraska Bank,Valley SunTrust Bank,Atlanta Flagstar Bank, FSB,Troy 
First Tennessee Bank, National 
Association,Memphis 
UMB Bank, National 
Association,Kansas City 
Associated Bank, National 
Association,Green Bay 
MidFirst Bank,Oklahoma City 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National 
Association,Columbus 
Valley National Bank,Passaic 
Flagstar Bank, FSB,Troy UBS Bank USA,Salt Lake City 
City First Bank of D.C., National 
Association,Washington 
South Central Bank, National 
Association,Chicago 
USAA Federal Savings Bank,San 
Antonio 
Umpqua Bank,Roseburg 
Regions Bank,Birmingham 
Deutsche Bank Trust Company 
Americas,New York 
Old National Bank,Evansville 
United National Bank,Cairo 
State Street Bank and Trust 
Company,Boston 
South Central Bank, National 
Association,Chicago 
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Sterling Federal Bank, F.S.B.,Sterling First Citizens Bank,Luverne United National Bank,Cairo 
Iberiabank,Lafayette State Farm Bank, F.S.B.,Bloomington First Bank,Strasburg 
State Street Bank and Trust Company,Boston Columbus State Bank,Columbus Commerce Bank,Geneva 
n
im
y-
n
e
tw
o
rk
-7
: 
2
0
1
7
Q
1
 -
 2
0
1
8
Q
4
 
Sterling Federal Bank, F.S.B.,Sterling 
USAA Federal Savings Bank,San 
Antonio 
New York Community Bank,Westbury 
City First Bank of D.C., National 
Association,Washington 
Bank of Hawaii,Honolulu Commerce Bank,Geneva 
Associated Bank, National Association,Green 
Bay 
Deutsche Bank Trust Company 
Americas,New York 
City First Bank of D.C., National 
Association,Washington 
First Nebraska Bank,Valley Arvest Bank,Fayetteville MidFirst Bank,Oklahoma City 
The Huntington National Bank,Columbus Silicon Valley Bank,Santa Clara Sterling Federal Bank, F.S.B.,Sterling 
South Central Bank, National 
Association,Chicago 
Fifth Third Bank,Cincinnati 
State Street Bank and Trust 
Company,Boston 
KeyBank National Association,Cleveland 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National 
Association,Columbus 
State Farm Bank, F.S.B.,Bloomington 
Cathay Bank,Los Angeles 
Webster Bank, National 
Association,Waterbury 
Regions Bank,Birmingham 
Old National Bank,Evansville SunTrust Bank,Atlanta Valley National Bank,Passaic 
SunTrust Bank,Atlanta First Bank,Strasburg 
U.S. Bank National 
Association,Cincinnati 
 
Table 9:Results estimated based on ROA 
Percentages of Positive and Negative Influencer Banks, from the set of top 10 Core Banks 
 Influential Positive (Green) Influential Negative (Red) 
2005-2006 
Columbus State Bank, Columbus 
2/10 
Regions Bank, Birmingham 
2/10 
Prosperity Bank, El Campo State Street Bank and Trust Company, Boston 
2007-2008 
Webster Bank, National Association, 
Waterbury 
2/10 
First Hope Bank, A National Banking Association, Hope 
3/10 
Valley National Bank, Passaic UMB Bank, National Association, Kansas City 
 Old National Bank, Evansville 
2009-2010 
KeyBank National Association, Cleveland 
1/10 
Commerce Bank, Geneva 
3/10  The Northern Trust Company, Chicago 
 Fifth Third Bank, Cincinnati 
2011-2012 
UBS Bank USA, Salt Lake City 
2/10 
E*TRADE Bank, Arlington 
3/10 Cathay Bank, Los Angeles Sterling Federal Bank, F.S.B., Sterling 
 First Tennessee Bank, National Association, Memphis 
2013-2014 
Associated Bank, National Association, Green 
Bay 
2/10 
United National Bank, Cairo 
3/10 
Columbus State Bank, Columbus First Citizens Bank, Luverne 
 First Tennessee Bank, National Association, Memphis 
2015-2016 
Iberiabank, Lafayette 
3/10 
Banco Santander Puerto Rico, San Juan 
4/10 
Regions Bank, Birmingham Discover Bank, Greenwood 
Bank of Hawaii, Honolulu U.S. Bank National Association, Cincinnati 
 UMB Bank, National Association, Kansas City 
2017-2018 
Silicon Valley Bank, Santa Clara 
2/10 
Banco Santander Puerto Rico, San Juan 
2/10 JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, 
Columbus 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, Columbus 
Table 10:Results estimated based on ROE 
Percentages of Positive and Negative Influencer Banks, from the set of top10 Core Banks 
 Influential Positive (Green) Influential Negative (Red) 
2005-2006 
Columbus State Bank, Columbus 
2/10 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, Columbus 
4/10 
Cathay Bank, Los Angeles State Street Bank and Trust Company, Boston 
 The Northern Trust Company, Chicago 
 United National Bank, Cairo 
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Table 11:Results estimated based on NIMY 
Percentages of Positive and Negative Influencer Banks, from the set of top10 Core Banks 
 Influential Positive (Green) Influential Negative (Red) 
2005-2006 
South Central Bank, National 
Association,Chicago 1/10 
UBS Bank USA,Salt Lake City 
2/10 
 Flagstar Bank, FSB,Troy 
2007-2008 
First Hope Bank, A National Banking 
Association,Hope 1/10 
KeyBank National Association,Cleveland 
2/10 
 Webster Bank, National Association,Waterbury 
2009-2010 
First Bank,Strasburg 
2/10 
Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas,New York 
2/10 
Fifth Third Bank,Cincinnati Flagstar Bank, FSB,Troy 
2011-2012 
USAA Federal Savings Bank,San Antonio 
1/10 
Silicon Valley Bank,Santa Clara 
3/10  United National Bank,Cairo 
 UBS Bank USA,Salt Lake City 
2013-2014 
The Huntington National Bank,Columbus 
2/10 
Flagstar Bank, FSB,Troy 
3/10 
Associated Bank, National Association,Green 
Bay 
First Citizens Bank,Luverne 
 Umpqua Bank,Roseburg 
2015-2016 
State Street Bank and Trust Company,Boston 
1/10 
Flagstar Bank, FSB,Troy 
3/10  South Central Bank, National Association,Chicago 
 United National Bank,Cairo 
2017-2018 
SunTrust Bank,Atlanta 
1/10 
City First Bank of D.C., National Association,Washington 
2/10 
 Sterling Federal Bank, F.S.B.,Sterling 
 
Results from Core, Influential (positive), Influential (negative):  
We observe from Tables 5, 6, 7 that there is significant “overlap” between the top 10 core banks 
and the top 10 influential banks, which is from 3/10 to 7/10 (see Tables 8, 9, 10). Therefore, we 
may say that core banks are also influential banks at percentage 30% and above. Moreover, we 
found that there are banks that are both positive “influencers” and negative “influencers” 
indicated by yellow color in figures Tables 5, 6, 7. In addition, we found in roa-network-7 (2017Q1 
- 2018Q4) that JP Morgan was core bank, being both positive and negative “influencer”. Banks 
that are both positive and negative “influencers” have “mixed influence-correlation” with the 
2007-2008 
Cathay Bank, Los Angeles 
2/10 
MidFirst Bank, Oklahoma City 
3/10 State Farm Bank, F.S.B., Bloomington First Hope Bank, A National Banking Association, Hope 
 South Central Bank, National Association, Chicago 
2009-2010 
First Tennessee Bank, National Association, 
Memphis 
2/10 
Commerce Bank, Geneva 
3/10 
Umpqua Bank, Roseburg The Northern Trust Company, Chicago 
 Banco Santander Puerto Rico, San Juan 
2011-2012 
Cathay Bank, Los Angeles 
2/10 
E*TRADE Bank, Arlington 
1/10 
The Northern Trust Company, Chicago  
2013-2014 
City First Bank of D.C., National Association, 
Washington 
2/10 
E*TRADE Bank, Arlington 
2/10 
Associated Bank, National Association, Green 
Bay 
Silicon Valley Bank, Santa Clara 
2015-2016 
Iberiabank, Lafayette 
2/10 
Banco Santander Puerto Rico, San Juan 
3/10 UMB Bank, National Association, Kansas City U.S. Bank National Association, Cincinnati 
 Discover Bank, Greenwood 
2017-2018 
Silicon Valley Bank, Santa Clara 
2/10 
First Nebraska Bank, Valley 
3/10 United National Bank, Cairo City First Bank of D.C., National Association, Washington 
 Banco Santander Puerto Rico, San Juan 
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banking system: they have significant positive influence-correlation with some part of the system, 
while on the other hand they have also significant negative influence-correlation with another 
part of the system. It is important to notice that we observe from Tables 8, 9, 10 that the 
percentage of negative influential banks to the core banks is higher, compared to the percentage 
of positive influential banks. As a result, the monitoring of other banks (via the core banks) may 
be realized though negative correlations. 
 
 
Figure 2: 
 
 
 
Figure 3: 
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Figure 4: 
 
Results from Density (positive and negative):  
We observe from Figures 2, 3, and 4 that the values for ROA, ROE and NIMY are more or less 
stable around 50% positive-50% negative for all years from 2005 to 2016. However, for the last 
period of 2017-2018 we observe a striking behaviour: for all ratios (ROA, ROE and NIMY) the 
density of positive correlations is increasing up to 80% or 90%, while on the other hand, the 
density of negative correlations is decreasing “symmetrically” up to 10% or 20%. In other words, 
the banks are much more positively correlated than negatively correlated. This finding may have 
strong implications for the systemic risk of the banking system as a whole, in sense that the time 
series of banks (ROA, ROE, NIMY) are moving towards the same direction (same trend). 
 
The above analysis reflects on GDP data during years 2005-2018. 
 
The period between last months of 2016 – 2019 the economy in US seems to 
get flourished based on GDP. “Gross Domestic Product or GDP is the total monetary or market 
value of all the finished goods and services produced within a country's borders in a specific time 
period” from Investopedia. As a main and most known measure of overall domestic production, 
it operates as a comprehensive and important scorecard of the country’s economic health. 
 
Based on the site Statista, it is clearly depicted the process of GDP in US during period 2005-2019 
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Figure 5: U.S GDP 2004-2018 3 
  
  
During period 2015-2018, it is mentioned in increase in GDP and this justifies the fact that all our 
metrics have been increased during those years.  
 
                                                 
3 Source: https://www.statista.com/statistics 
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5. Conclusion 
Taking into account the above analysis, we sum up that the “Top Banks” (based on their market 
capitalization) are justifiably robust to economic shocks and tend to revive with stability during 
years. Some of them have been influenced by the crises but they start operations and plans in 
order to be survive among years (Mortgage Crisis 2008). The fact that one of the banks is a “top” 
bank; this does not mean that has the most links to the rest (“core or/and influential bank”).  
Based on Minimum Spanning Tree method and the Weighted degree (Positive and Negative), we 
found that core banks (we take the top 10 form data) are also influential banks at percentage 30% 
and above Furthermore we may come up with the detail that core banks are more vulnerable to 
any kind of crisis and this give us the ability to extract or predict the first “steps” of a financial 
shock by a change in the behaviour of core bank based on their historical reaction in same 
incidents. 
 
More specifically to MST and Weighted Degree Tables, banks that are both positive and negative 
“influencers” have “mixed influence-correlation” with the banking system: they have significant 
positive influence-correlation with some part of the system, comparing to the other sights they 
have also significant negative influence-correlation with another part of the system. Taking into 
account the above outputs, the monitoring of other banks (via the core banks) may be realized 
though negative correlations. 
 
Moreover, the most important indicator that functions as a snapshot of how healthy is the 
economy, the Gross Domestic Product or GDP which also shows us results related to the metrics 
based on ROA, ROE and NIMY. The whole process also confirms the fact that the 3 performance 
ratios we use in our metrics are reliable in order to evaluate the process of our banks and the 
combination with network analysis provides us demanding details. The network analysis metrics 
are completed mechanisms and gives us the “hub” or “behind the scenes” information in banking 
networks. Regarding density metric for the whole network, the banks are much more positively 
correlated than negatively correlated. The above finding may have strong implications for the 
systemic risk of the banking system as a whole, in sense that the time series of banks (ROA, ROE, 
NIMY) are moving towards the same direction (same trend). 
 
Last but not least, the above analysis belongs to an important keystone for each investor, 
governance, customer who wants to get information about the financial performance and the 
influence of top banks in order to manage in an reliable way its money and actions. 
The list of our ten top banks (out of 46) in all networks was different during time (based on the 
names of banks) but the numbers were not change essentially. That means that we don’t have a 
bank “super centralized” and the U.S. banks had and have a stable “attitude” to every shock in 
economy during time. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
[28] 
 
Bibliography 
 
1. Vandewalle, N., Brisbois, F., &Tordoir, X. (2001). Self-organized critical topology of stock 
markets. Quantitative Finance, vol. 1, 372–375. 
2. Bonanno, G., Caldarelli, G., Lillo, F., Miccichè, S., Vandewalle, N., & Mantegna, R., N. (2004). 
Networks of equities in financial markets. The European Physical Journal, B-Condensed 
Matter and Complex Systems, vol. 38(2), 363-371. 
3. Tse, C. K., Liu, J. & Lau, F. (2010). A network perspective of the stock market. Journal of 
Empirical Finance, vol. 17(4), 659-667. 
4. Tumminello, M., Lillo, F., & Mantegna, R. N. (2010). Correlation, hierarchies, and networks in 
financial markets. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 75(1), 40-58. 
5. Bowden, M. P. (2012). Information contagion within small worlds and changes in kurtosis and 
volatility in financial prices. Journal of Macroeconomics, vol. 34(2), 553-566. 
6. Hill, R. J. (1999). Comparing price levels across countries using minimum-spanning trees. 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 81(1), 135-142. 
7. Garlaschelli, D., Di Matteo, T., Aste, T., Caldarelli, G., &Loffredo, M. I. (2007). Interplay 
between topology and dynamics in the World Trade Web. The European Physical Journal B, 
vol. 57(2), pp. 159-164. 
8. Schiavo, S., Reyes, J. &Fagiolo, G. (2010). International trade and financialintegration: a 
weightednetworkanalysis. QuantitativeFinance, vol. 10(4), 389-399. 
9. Caraiani, P. (2013). Using Complex Networks to Characterize International Business Cycles. 
PLoS ONE, vol. 8(3).    
10. Allen, F., &Gale, D. (2000). Financial contagion. Journal of political economy, 108(1), 1-33. 
11. Cajueiro, D. O., &Tabak, B. M. (2008). The role of banks in the Brazilian Interbank Market: 
Does bank type matter?. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 387(27), 6825-
6836. 
12. Gai, P., Haldane, A., & Kapadia, S. (2011). Complexity, concentration and contagion. Journal 
of Monetary Economics, 58(5), 453-470. 
13. Minoiu, C., & Reyes, A. J. (2013). A network analysis of global banking: 1978–2010, Journal of 
Financial Stability, vol. 9 (2), 168-184.  
14. Papadimitriou, T., Gogas, P., &Tabak, B. M. (2013). Complex networks and banking systems 
supervision. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, vol. 392, 4429-4434. 
15. IMF, Financial crises: characteristics and indicators of vulnerability, World Economic Outlook, 
1998, pp. 74–97 (Chapter 4). 
16.  G. Hoggarth, R. Reis, V. Saporta, Costs of banking system instability: some empirical evidence, 
Journal of Banking & Finance 26 (5) (2002) 825–855. 
17.  L. Laeven, F. Valencia, Resolution of Banking crises: the good, the bad, and the ugly, IMF 
Working Paper 10/146, 2010. 
18.  R. Barrell, E. Philip Davis, O. Pomerantz, Costs of financial instability, household-sector 
balance sheets and consumption, Journal of Financial Stability 2 (2) (2006) 194–216. 
19.  J. Ackermann, The subprime crisis and its consequences, Journal of Financial Stability 4 (2008) 
329–337. 
20. A. DemirgüçKunt, E. Detragiache, The determinants of banking crises in developing and 
developed countries, IMF Staff Papers 45 (1) (1998). 
   
 
[29] 
 
21.  A. DemirgüçKunt, E. Detragiache, Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? 
An empirical investigation, Journal of Monetary Economics 49 (7) (2002) 1373–1406. 
22.  T. Poghosyan, M. Cihak, Distress in European banks: an analysis based on a new data set, IMF 
Working Paper 09/9, 2009. 
23. J.R. Barth, C. Lin, Y. Ma, J. Seade, F.M. Song, Do bank regulation, supervision and monitoring 
enhance or impede bank efficiency? Working Paper, 2010. 
24. D.O. Cajueiro, B.M. Tabak, The role of banks in the Brazilian interbank market: does bank type 
matter? Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 387 (27) (2008) 6825–6836. 
25.  G. Iori, R. Renò, G. De Masi, G. Caldarelli, Trading strategies in the Italian interbank market, 
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 376 (15) (2007) 467–479. 
26.  G. Iori, G. De Masi, O. Precup, G. Gabbi, G. Caldarelli, A network analysis of the Italian 
overnight money market, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 32 (1) (2008) 259–278. 
27.  C. Memmel, A. Sachs, Contagion in the interbank market and its determinants, Journal of 
Financial Stability 9 (1) (2013) 46–54. 
28.  P.E. Mistrulli, Assessing financial contagion in the interbank market: maximumentropy versus 
observed interbank lending patterns, Journal of Banking & Finance 35 (5) (2011) 1114–1127. 
29. A. Sokolov, R. Webster, A. Melatos, T. Kieu, Loan and non loan flows in the Australian 
interbank network, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 391 (9) (2012) 2867–
2882. 
30. K. Soramäki, M. Bech, J. Arnold, R. Glass, W. Beyeler, The topology of interbank payment 
flows, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 379 (1) (2007) 317–333. 
31. A. Spelta, T. Araújo, The topology of cross-border exposures: beyond the minimal spanning 
tree approach, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 391 (22) (2012) 5572–
5583. 
32. C. Upper, Simulation methods to assess the danger of contagion in interbank markets, Journal 
of Financial Stability 7 (3) (2011) 111–125. 
33. C. Upper, A. Worms, Estimating bilateral exposures in the German interbank market: is there 
a danger of contagion? European Economic Review 48 (4) (2004) 827–849. 
34. A. Krause, A. Giansante, Interbank lending and the spread of bank failures: a network model 
of systemic risk, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 83 (3) (2012) 583–608. 
35. A. Lenzu, G. Tedeschi, Systemic risk on different interbank network topologies, Physica A: 
Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 391 (15) (2012) 4331–4341. 
36. S. Li, J. He, Y. Zhuang, A network model of the interbank market, Physica A: Statistical 
Mechanics and its Applications 389 (24) (2010) 5587–5593. 
37. P. Gai, A. Haldane, S. Kapadia, Complexity, concentration and contagion, Journal of Monetary 
Economics 58 (5) (2011) 453–470. 
38. YanhuiGu, Shuzhen Zhu, ZhipingYang  andYuanjun Zhao, Research on banking systemic risk 
contagion based on network dynamic time-variant contagion kinetics model, Journal of 
Intelligent & Fuzzy Systems 37 (2019) 381–395. 
39. B.M. Tabak, T.R. Serra, D.O. Cajueiro, Topological properties of stock market networks: the 
case of Brazil, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 389 (2010)3240–3249  
40. J.G. Brida, W.A. Risso, Multidimensional minimal spanning tree: the Dow Jones case, Physica 
A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 387 (2008) 5205–5210. 
   
 
[30] 
 
41. R. Coelho, C.G. Gilmore, B. Lucey, P. Richmond, S. Hutzler, The evolution of interdependence 
in world equity markets-evidence from minimum spanning trees, Physica A: Statistical 
Mechanics and its Applications 376 (2007) 455–466. 
42. B.M. Tabak, T.R. Serra, D.O. Cajueiro, The expectation hypothesis of interest rates and 
network theory: the case of Brazil, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 388 
(2009) 1137–1149. 
43. C.G. Gilmore, B.M. Lucey, M.W. Boscia, Comovements in government bond markets: a 
minimum spanning tree analysis, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 389 
(2010) 4875–4886. 
44. Euler, L. (1741). SolutioProblematisadGeometriamSitusPertinentis, 
CommentariiAcademiaeScientiarumImperialisPetropolitanae 8, 128-140, OperaOmnia (1). 7, 
1-10. 
45. Milgram, S. (1967). The small world problem. Psychology today, 2(1), 60-67. 
46. Granovetter, M. (1974), Getting a Job: A Study of Contracts and Careers, Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press. 
47. Newman, M. E. (2001). Scientific collaboration networks. II. Shortest paths, weighted 
networks, and centrality. Physical review E, 64 (1), 016132. 
48. Barabási, A. L., Jeong, H., Ravasz, R., Néda, Z., Vicsek, T., & Schubert, A. (2002). On the 
topology of the scientific collaboration networks. Physica A,311 (590-614), 4-6. 
49. Thieffry, D., Huerta, A. M., Pérez‐Rueda, E., &Collado‐Vides, J. (1998). From specific gene 
regulation to genomic networks: a global analysis of transcriptional regulation in Escherichia 
coli. Bioessays, 20(5), 433-440. 
50. Schwikowski, B., Uetz, P., & Fields, S. (2000). A network of protein–protein interactions in 
yeast. Nature biotechnology, 18(12), 1257-1261. 
51. Wagner, A., & Fell, D. A. (2001). The small world inside large metabolic networks. Proceedings 
of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 268(1478), 1803-1810.   
52. Shen-Orr, S. S., Milo, R., Mangan, S., &Alon, U. (2002). Network motifs in the transcriptional 
regulation network of Escherichia coli. Nature genetics, 31(1), 64-68. 
53. Guimera, R., Mossa, S., Turtschi, A., &Amaral, L. N. (2005). The worldwide air transportation 
network: Anomalous centrality, community structure, and cities' global roles. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences, 102(22), 7794-7799 
54. Pagani, G. A., & Aiello, M. (2013). The power grid as a complex network: a survey. Physica A: 
Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 392(11), 2688-2700. 
55. Albert, R., Jeong, H., & Barabási, A. L. (1999). Internet: Diameter of the world-wide web. 
Nature, 401(6749), 130-131. 
56. Faloutsos, M., Faloutsos, P., &Faloutsos, C. (1999, August). On power-lawrelationships of the 
internettopology. In ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review (Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 
251-262). ACM. 
57. Reyes, J., Schiavo, S., &Fagiolo, G. (2008). Assessing the evolution of international economic 
integration using random walk betweenness centrality: The cases of east asia and 
latinamerica. Advances in Complex Systems, 11(05), 685-702. 
58. Montoya, J. M., &Solé, R. V. (2002). Small world patterns in food webs. Journal of theoretical 
biology, 214(3), 405-412. 
   
 
[31] 
 
59. Boginski, V., Butenko, S. &Pardalos, P. M. (2006). Mining market data: a network approach. 
Computers & Operations Research, 33(11), 3171-3184. 
60. Shen, C. & Li, T. (2010). Multi-document summarization via the minimum dominating set. In 
Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Computational Linguistics (984-992). 
Association for Computational Linguistics. 
61. Alex Fornito, Andrew Zalesky and Edward T. Bullmore (2016). Fundamentals of Brain Network 
Analysis Book.  
62. R.N. Mantegna, Hierarchical structure in financial markets, European Physical Journal B 11 
(1999) 193–197 
 
 
Supporting web-links  
1. https://www.wikipedia.org  
2. https://www.investopedia.com 
3. https://www.fdic.gov  
 
 
